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Abstract 
An enlarged EU  might be structurally integrated, but the ways in which pre-1989 EU 
members used to imagine their counterparts during the Cold War period have profoundly 
influenced the ways in which ‘east’ Europe has been and still is thought nowadays (hence 
the remaining ideational divergences within a political Europe). The paper argues that 
European construction and pos-1989 enlargement of the EU towards East imply a form of 
subtle and untold domination of the Western part of the continent subtlety and at times 
unconsciously by institutions of the EU or by academic discourses on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Such domination, as an unintended consequence, is best explored on the 
ideational level and through the central role that 1989 has taken in this process. 
Discussing slope-metaphors and allochronisms in the field of a European common 
memory, this paper shows how artificial distances are created between Eastern and 
Western Europe. By combining allochronism and heteronomy, we have coined the new 
term of ‘heterochrony’ to express the situation in which a given group does not have the 
capacity of choosing its own laws and the cognitive means to think of itself and where such 
situation is due to reasons of different time location (in that case in a backward situation) 
than other autonomous groups. Such heterochrony might lead to a halt of transnational 
cooperation in Europe and have negative impacts on the self-perception of Europe. 
 
Keywords 
European identity, European memory, symbolic other, othering process, 1989, path-
dependency, neo-institutionalism, allochronism, heterochrony, western Europe, Central 
and Eastern Europe, history, self-understanding of Europe.  
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1. Introduction: Othering process, cognitive means and time. 
 
We will discuss in this paper the view that the enlarged European Union we now live in and 
which we intellectually perceive is as much the direct result of 1989 than it is of the efforts to create 
the first European Communities in the 1950s. The breaking apart of the Communist block ushered 
in a new era for a political Europe where positive features (EU enlargement commenced in 1995 by 
incorporating the hitherto ‘neutral’ states of Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the 2004 
and 2007 enlargements) coexist with more problematic ones (unsolved security agreements between 
the EU and Russia, some occidentalist reductionist ways of describing Eastern Europe in urgent 
need to catch up with (Western) Europe, or the stumbling bocks still existing between East and 
West on the debate of a common European memory). One could say that 1989 ‘made’ Europe, but 
in an imperfect manner. So, what has been the impact of European integration on 1989? Prior 
western European integration facilitated and legitimated, it may be surmised, the notion of a ‘return 
to Europe’ voiced by the dissidents and revolutionaries in the Soviet bloc as well as the 
Gorbachevian notion of a Common European Home. Yet, how was the transformation of Europe 
after 1989 constrained and enabled by the pre-existence of a common western political project?  
 
1989 ‘made’ Europe because what was hitherto a divided continent now became united. 
More specifically, the revolutions of 1989 brought in their wake German unity. Negotiations 
regarding German unification and the integration of this new Germany into western structures were 
to change fundamentally the reality and the idea of Europe. One could say that Germany epitomizes 
the problem of an enlarged Europe Union to 27 members: by incorporating the eastern part into the 
western part of the FRG, the historical experience and identity of the GDR tended to be written off 
and to disappear (and quite symptomatically, they are dubbed the ‘new’ Länder so as to insist that 
things had be started anew there) based on the assumption that they had little, or simply nothing to 
offer to the western experience or ways of doing politics and of imagining itself.  
 
We will argue that a same phenomenon has happened between EU15 (western Europe) and 
the new 12 EU member states: 15+12 may have created an enlarged EU that is now indeed 
structurally integrated (or in the continuous process of complete integration), but the ways in which 
EU15/West Germany used to imagine their/its counterpart(s) during the Cold War period have 
profoundly influenced the ways in which ‘east’ Europe has been and still is thought nowadays 
(hence the ideational divergences that this conference tries to tackle). Put differently, the process of 
ideational convergence that EU enlargement should have carried through and fulfilled in the period 
1989-2004 was profoundly and negatively affected by an occidentalist bias in which the 
GDR/Eastern Europe was thought not on the basis of its own merit, features or characteristics but as 
the negative Other of an integrating Western Europe. ‘Othering’ mechanisms most frequently 
contribute to simplifications and negative stereotypes, and this paper will discuss some of these 
mechanisms and their consequences in the power relation between eastern and western Europe. Of 
interest for us here will be the case of collective memory around European themes, political 
contributions to a European acquis and questions of collective autonomy, and how 1989 has been a 
turning point in such problematic mutual perceptions between Eastern and Western Europe. The 
paper will not discuss the institutional arrangements of post-1989 EU life but dwells at length on 
ideational and cognitive issues for two reasons. One because ‘Europe’ (as a political project) needs 
to rethink itself if it wants to be more inclusive and more democracy-friendly (the self-reflective 
dimension of Europe). Second, because for individuals and state to feel as fully equals within the 
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European realms need not just to have the same access to EU institutions but should also have equal 
access to cognitive means1 (the capacity of auto-institution on the cognitive level). 
 
Of central concern in this paper is the study of certain discourses articulated around deep 
differences between East/West and favoring dichotomous understanding of Europe. We will try to 
understand why such discourses occur, what are their meanings and discuss some of their examples, 
a famous illustration being that of Norman Davies when he dissects the division ‘East and West 
Europe’. In that perspective (and in his critique the occidentalistic-cum-orientalistic framework) 
Norman Davies shows how the famous curriculum course on ‘Western Civilisation’ introduces 
sloppy reasoning and judgemental dualisms of the following kind: 
1. That the western and eastern halves of Europe are separate entities with little or nothing in 
common. 
2. That Eastern Europe is not really part of Europe, or not part of ‘the real Europe’. 
3. That the East-West division of Europe, which can be observed in different manifestations at 
different times, is fixed and permanent. 
4. That ‘the West’ is superior. 
5. That all summaries of Western civilisation / European history can safely omit anything which 
belongs to the different and inferior East. (The only exception to this rule is Russia, which, 
being powerful, automatically qualifies for inclusion.) (Davies 2006: 60).  
This type of idea is also somehow embedded in much of the political science literature dealing with 
democratization and civil society promotion. There, one can find similar biases simply in the fact 
that ‘transition’ has to be managed from outside by western donors (instead of counting on local 
forces), or that civil society often has to be constructed and engineered into the right type of 
political participation (rather than leaving the existing institution choosing their own course of 
action and rhetoric to do so).2
 
 Attila Melegh, in a recent stimulant book, questions also such dualisms and argues that an 
East-West slope runs across the self-perception of Europe. This slope implies a sense of normative 
judgment where the west is the positive endpoint of the slope (embodied by a liberal humanitarian 
utopia) that easterners of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are supposed to climb to reach 
‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘market economy’ and the like, while on the lower end, an abnormal East 
is trailing behind in a state of ‘backwardness’ in which the legacy of the past or ‘incomplete 
nationalisms’3 weighs heavily (Melegh 2006: 1-3). Melegh’s point is obviously not to ‘measure’ at 
which points various countries, institutions or individuals are positioned onto this slope, but “is 
rather how these ‘East-West slopes’ based on the idea of diminishing civilization toward the ‘East’ 
enable the translations of ‘liberal humanitarian utopias’ onto a global scale and how the related 
identity structures actually operate and transform themselves into social and political action or 
individual narratives in the context of Central and Eastern Europe” (ibid: 2). In other words this 
imaginary slope has a constitutive role in the self-perception and self-understanding of people of 
and involved with Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
We will argue in this paper that European construction (around the EU, alternatively referred 
to as ‘Europe’ as oppose to Europe, the geographical space independent of the political Union) and 
enlargement of the EU towards East imply a form of subtle and untold domination of the Western 
                                                 
1 I draw here inspiration on the work of Castoriadis for whom autonomy is not just a political autonomy a la Rousseau, 
but also the capacity to choose its cognitive means to do so (Castoriadis 1986, 1997 and 1999). We will develop later 
this point in the part dealing with heterochrony. See in particular Section 3.b. 
2 For a critique of this Promothean conception of democracy and civil society promotion which does not consider 
enough local resources and that has negative social effects, see, e.g., Hann & Dunn (1997) and Mendelson  (2002). 
3 For an overview of the alleged defect of Eastern European nationalisms, see Todorova (2005). 
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part of the continent subtlety and at times unconsciously by institutions of the EU or by academic 
discourses on Central and Eastern Europe. Such domination, bordering at times with coloniality4 as 
an unintended consequence, is best explored on the ideational level and through the central role that 
1989 has taken in this process. That there was a relation of power between the EU and (soon to be) 
candidate Eastern European states in the period 1989-2004 is out of doubt (one just needs to think 
of the Copenhagen criteria to respect in order to become part of the club). The sub-hypotheses we 
are exploring here is that domination is not a conscious fact but a consequence of institutional 
practices rooted in a European community born during the Cold War and of certain academic 
devices reinforcing divides between social groups (in our case, the ‘east’ and the ‘west’). In this 
process, 1989 plaid a particular role by leaving a lasting imprint on official discourses on Eastern 
Europe and influenced by a reading of Communism having atomized and destroyed all positive 
constitutive elements in Eastern Europe that had no other issue but to catch up and emulate the 
western ways of doing.  
 
Such view can be found elsewhere nowadays in some of the debates about a European 
memory and historical representation of Europe. To advance a metaphor, we could say that on the 
theme of European memory and identity, there is a sort of East-West slope running across the 
continent where, e.g. Eastern Europe still needs to come to term with the Holocaust and still needs 
to do some work on its collective history with regard to the extermination of Jews.5 We argue that 
there is a slope here as well, because differences in the Vergangenheitsbewältigungen tend to be 
expressed not only in normative term (‘they must come to term with this problem’, or ‘they have 
not done their homework’, etc.), but also in terms of different time locations (‘they are trailing back 
on the work on memory, etc).  Johannes Fabian, in his important albeit little quoted work on Time 
and the Other (1983), underlines that one of the favorite ways for anthropology to ‘make its 
objects’ is through time and what he terms ‘denial of coevalness’ (Fabian 1983: 32) or 
‘allochronism’ (from the Greek ‘allos’ for ‘other, and ‘xronos’ for time). Allochronism could be 
defined as the (usually forced) positioning of one’s group in a different time than that of the 
reference group. His thesis is that “anthropology has emerged and established itself as an 
allochronic discourse; it is a science of other men in another Time. It is a discourse whose referent 
has been removed from the present of the speaking/writing subject” (ibid.: 143).  
 
Although Fabian criticizes the discipline of anthropology (for its contribution to the 
realization of colonialism), his arguments runs parallel to that of Melegh, when the former sustains 
that anthropology “promoted a scheme in terms of which not only past cultures, but all living 
societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time—some upstream, others 
downstream. Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation, modernization (and their cousins, 
industrialization, urbanization) are all terms whose conceptual content devices, in ways that can be 
specified, from evolutionary time” (Fabian 1983: 17). The problem with such allochronism and 
slope-metaphor is not that they ascribe people definitively to a certain place, or position on the scale 
of civilization or of Erinnerungsarbeit, but that they create artificial distances between different 
groups and that they ‘otherize’ given social groups. They put certain groups in a more active (the 
one judging the time location and deciding of the allochronism) or passive stance (the group lagging 
behind6). The negative results for the group at a lower end of such othering process and delineation 
                                                 
4 Melegh defines colonialty as “a system of power understood as a complex form of domination, including the 
hierarchical classification of the populations of the planet, the reformulation of local concepts of space and time, the 
export of sexual energies into the ‘East’, the ‘imperial gaze’ and most importantly the colonization of consciousness. 
The latter point can be summed up as ‘an energy and a machinery to transform differences into values’ and as the 
consequence ‘subalternization of knowledge and societies” (Melegh 2006: 29. His emphasis). 
5 See Troebst’s seminal papers (2005, 2006 and 2007) on that matter. 
6 Todorova (2005: 163f) also uses the concept of allochronism with regard to a certain analysis of the temporalities of 
Eastern European nationalisms. 
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process between active/passive, modern/traditional is first that, as Melegh argues, it affects the self-
understanding of such people leading to discriminatory or racist views, and second that it 
disempowers them putting them in a situation of heteronomy7. By combining allochronism and 
heteronomy, we have coined the new term of ‘heterochrony’ to express the situation in which a 
given group does not have the capacity of choosing its own laws and the cognitive means to think 
of itself and where such situation is due to reasons of different time location (in that case in a 
backward situation) than other autonomous groups. Let us see now how such theme can be found in 
the post-1989 phase, how this has become an institutional problem and how it relates to the question 
of European memory. 
 
2. Three questions on 1989, Europe: Directions and Pluralities 
  
If there was an impact of 1989 on European ‘integration’8, there is probably also some 
reflections to gain from the following reversed question: What has been the impact of European 
integration on 1989? In other words, has the transformation of a post-1989 eastern Europe been 
constrained by the pre-existence of a common western political project, west of the Iron Curtain? If 
so, how? To give short answers to this question, we will resort to three sub-questions.  
  
The first question: Has there been an impact of 1989 on European Integration? If so, of 
what kind? This is well beyond the scope of this paper, and 1989 surely had a variety of impacts on 
European integration and European societies at large. A short answer, easier to give now that the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements took place is that the collapse of Iron Curtain has allowed the entry of 
former communist as well as some neutral countries into the EEC/EU. 1989 has, in a way, given a 
new impetus towards a revamped and enlarged common ‘European House’ (to take the phrase of 
Gorbatchov). But why was it that ‘Europe’ became the roof for integration of a post-1989 eastern 
Europe? This leads us to the second question. 
 
What has been the impact of European integration on 1989? The response, though 
seemingly tautological, is simply another wave of ‘European integration’, yet of another kind. Since 
the EEC was one of the most effective supra-national political institutions at the time of the collapse 
of the Soviet empire, the model of European integration provided a direct blueprint or a clear 
horizon for eastern Europe (hence the (problematic) notion shared by many that there was a ‘return 
to Europe’). The process is what is referred to in neo-institutionalist parlance as a case of path-
dependency. Once the project of an effective European community was re-launched in the 1980s 
and that political momentum was given towards further integration by the 1987 Single Act, the 
existing and already expanding European institution was the natural candidate at the time of the 
Soviet collapse to preside over renewed collaboration between East and West. Other ‘pan-
European’ institutions existed and mattered already back then, like NATO, Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Council of Europe, but since the post-1989 task 
included also the question of German re-unification (a still very sour point to many European states 
back in 1989, and an issue that had driven a decisive wedge in the East-West relationship in the 
                                                 
7 To define heteronomy, we will tap again into the work of Castoriadis. Autonomy, as pointed earlier, is the capacity to 
choose its own laws and the cognitive means to do so. An autonomous society is one that has the capacity of auto-
institution, that is the capacity for societies to openly ‘call into question their own institution, their representation of the 
world, their social imaginary significations’ (Castoriadis 1997: 17). 
In an heteronymous society, there is no capacity to choose its laws and/or there is closure on the cognitive level. By 
closure Castoriadis means that a given society does not have the possibilities to choose the ways and means in which 
they reflect about themselves. Closure implies the law of others imposed on this society. 
8 The term ‘integration’ would be discussing since it is highly contentious. For a discussion of the term ‘integration’ see 
the work on US-influence on the first steps of European construction in Winand (1993) and Aldrich (1997). 
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nascent cold war in the late 1940s), the issue of East-West unification had to be subordinated to a 
political forum with binding supra-national powers and in which the USA could have a say.9 NATO 
could not be such a forum (because of its military nature and the reluctance of the Soviet Union/CIS 
to abandon all of its sphere of influence—although NATO was also part of the discussion back in 
1989, as much as it is still part of the problem in Europe now if one just looks at the stand off 
between Russia and Europe on the question of Georgia this Summer), while the Council of Europe 
and the CSCE (transformed in 1994 into the OSCE) were only too loose inter-governmental 
institutions to be able to decide on such important matters. Moreover, as observes Delcour (2008), 
by the time of the Wall collapse, the EEC was already engaged in managing a flow of aid to Poland 
and Hungary and therefore the EEC was the natural candidate to cope with the task of helping 
Eastern Europe out of planed economy and of bureaucratic dictatorships. 
 
Why would path-dependency be important in this phase of transition? Because institutions 
(such as that of the EEC and EU) have their development constrained by past learning processes 
and organizational memories rather than by totally new external impetuses.10 In our case, the 
institutional lasting imprint we will look is that of the cold war vision of Eastern Europe (See 
Illutration 2 below) that had been totally destroyed by the Soviet domination and which was 
therefore to be rebuild and reconstruct from scratch.11 The EEC (soon to become EU) which was 
well active by 1989 as an inter-governmental forum, and which in part had just started working with 
some Central European countries, was therefore the natural candidate to oversee the re-birth of 
‘Europe’, east and west alike, launching a new phase of European integration. This leads us to the 
third level of questioning, which has to do with the nature of ‘Europe’, as a political project, and the 
consequences of this dominant position acquired in 1989 by ‘Europe’ which was born out of the 
western European experience of integration. 
  
What has been the impact of a pre-existent integrated political western Europe for eastern 
Europe? ‘Europe’, as a political project born of the creation of the first communities in the 1950s 
(European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, EURATOM) was not a 
‘neutral’ or ‘technocratic’ project, but was clearly a political project favoured and largely funded by 
the USA in the immediate post-WW2 period (Aldrich 1997). If one wants therefore to understand 
what has been the impact of a pre-existent political Europe (EEC) on the post-1989 Europe, one has 
to understand not only the EEC in the 1980s but also the origins of this political Europe, for it 
carries in seeds certain traits of the 1950s that might be (or have been) detrimental towards eastern 
Europe four or five decades later. It is thus important to understand the biases that ‘Europe’ has 
both for eastern Europe and for Europe as a geographical entity. It is puzzling to note, first of all, 
how the term “Europe” is now widely referred to as a short cut for a political Europe embodied now 
by the EU, yet, when one opens a history book on Europe, very little will be said about this political 
Europe, or that it is not so well ‘integrated’ with the history of European states (just to take two 
                                                 
9 On how the USA’s influence over Europe gradually vanished from the 1980s onwards, see Lundestad (2003).  
10 On path-dependency and neo-institutionalism in general, see DiMaggio & Powell (1991: in particular pp. 192ff). 
11 One could argue that path-dependency is also important here because the nature of European construction has been to 
turn its back to a past of national antagonism and enmity (e.g. France vs Germany) and to construct a positive 
collaborative project instead. The period 1989-1991 is another moment where Europe is reluctant to look at a certain 
past of rather unorthodox cooperation in the field of military cooperation in the shadow of the NATO and of unpleasant 
alliances and flirts with extreme right-wing groups in Western Europe. The so-called GLADIO network of stay-behind 
armies in case of Soviet invasion was behind the strategy of tension by western European governments in the 1960s and 
1970s. Ganser (2005) discusses at length these networks. It is interesting to see that these were partly made public 
around 1990 and 1991, but passed the Fall 1991, all European governments then refused to participate and comment on 
their existence. Can this be another impact of 1989, namely a sort of Flucht nach vorn to avoid to deal with western 
European sore experience and concentrate on enlargement instead?  
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examples, we can quote the work of Tony Judt (2005)12 or Harold James (2003), where the question 
of European integration occupies only a tiny portion of their influential works on Europe taken as a 
geographical aggregation of nation-states). So there is a discrepancy between the avowed goal of a 
political Europe to represent an integrated physical Europe in general and the place granted to this 
political project in historical works (and probably in the mind of most Europeans). This discrepancy 
is nonetheless interesting for us because it indicates that the political project of ‘Europe’ has been 
trying to project the idea of a common European fate as a basis for a full integration.13 It is this 
project, that one could qualify as hegemonic since it tends to erase other narratives and tends 
towards its own satisfaction via diverse institutional means. ‘Europe’ disposes of many ways and 
institutions through which it can diffuse its visions of ‘Europe’. These institutions take various 
forms, mostly cognitive ones by playing on European symbols, historical memory, etc. although the 
financial aspect is no less important, with massive projects on European identity, history, funded by 
the Commission over the last ten or fifteen years. Interestingly, the two declarations by the EEC/EU 
dealing explicitly with the need to bolster a common European identity were passed by the EEC in 
1973 (Copenhagen Declaration) and in 1983 (Stuttgart Declaration), well before the end of the Cold 
War and in a period where ‘Europe’ meant western Europe.14  
  
The surge of such literature on a ‘cultural’ Europe is one manifestation of a rather recent 
way of conceiving of ‘Europe’ as a place allegedly sharing a same cultural stratum.15 If we take the 
representation of European construction in a selection of European textbooks, we can see that there 
is a Europeanisation of the historical representation of ‘Europe’. By Europeanisation, we mean that 
we are not only witnessing the drafting of a common supra-national curriculum around Europe and 
the publication of common European textbooks in France and Germany,16 but also that there is a 
convergence in terms of what ‘Europe’ is about: National different views about European 
construction gradually vanish and leave place to a common narrative around a cultural Europe 
(Challand 2009). 1989 is presented as an important unfolding moment for ‘Europe’ since it offered 
the possibility for eastern Europe to converge and follow the path of western Europe.  
 
The following map (Illustration 1) exemplify this occidentalist vision of Eastern Europe 
whose future depends on the west: once the Soviet block collapsed, Eastern Europe defined as 
‘Balkanised’ will gradually transform (‘Occidentalise’ itself) and thus become an extension of 
western Europe (and here of the broader political environment of the post-9/11 era).  
 
                                                 
12 Although, interestingly for our Conference, Judt’s narration precisely starts in December 1989. 
13 On the European identity debate, see Stråth (2005, 2007), Larat (2005), etc. 
14 On the timing of such declarations, see Shore (2000). 
15 I am grateful to Chris Amrbruster for observing that this  literature on a cultural Europe is also an effect of 1989 and 
the ‘return to Europe’. The cultural claim to Europe could be made most easily from CEE on the basis of religion, art, 
literature and so on because other political and economic claims to Europeanness across the whole continent were 
perceived as weak. Back to a certain idea of ‘slope’. 
16 See e.g. Delouche, F., & al. (1992). Histoire de l'Europe. Paris: Hachette, or Delouche, F., & al. (1997). Histoire de 
l'Europe. Paris: Hachette. 
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Illustration 1: The Impact of 1989, seen from a French History Textbook
Source: Binoist, B., & al. (2004). Histoire. Terminales ES et L (1st ed.). Paris: Magnard, p. 147 
 
 
Such occidentalist representation mirrors what we have called earlier the lasting imprint of 
cold war visions of Eastern Europe and, which, in a way, pre-announces a hegemonic western 
European agenda on defining it. Illustration 217 is a political poster of 1952 calling for the creation 
 
 
Illustration 2: West-German poster 
for a European Defence 
Community, 1952.  
of the European Defence Community (a plan later voted down 
by the French Parliament in 1954). One sees that unity is 
needed to protect against the flood of red blood (a common way 
to refer to the communist threat), which tries to break into a 
peaceful and blossoming land. Europe is here still a loose 
understanding of anti-communism and not uniquely of the Six 
first member states (the banners listed here is more than those of 
the Six who joined the ECSC in 1951). While there is prosperity 
west of this ‘wall’, east of it, there is nothing but a turmoil of 
destruction and havoc provoked by the red peril. Let us now see 
more into details how the institutionally hegemonic views 
favoured by (western) ‘Europe’ tends to be problematic for a 
post-1989 Europe. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Reproduced in Funken, W., & Koltrowitz, B. (2003). Geschichte Plus. Ausgabe Sachsen Gymnasien (1st ed.). Berlin: 
Cornelsen - Volk und Wissen Verlag , p.  81. For a detailed analysis of the ‘others’ of Europe, see Challand 2009.
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3. Projecting Europe 
  
Projecting the integration of Europe on the basis of a common fate (and we touch here on 
the theme of the self-reflective dimension of Europe outlined in the introduction) is problematic in 
three senses. 
3.a) Negative Western stereotypes of CEE as a land of emptiness?  
 First, in this vision of an always expanding (western) political Europe, it is as though eastern 
Europe does not have anything to offer to European integration. In the three questions I have raised 
above, it is as though eastern Europe was the land of emptiness, with no wealth, knowledge, 
institutions, or history upon which a post-1989 Europe could draw resources, only the passive 
receptacles of information, good practices and projects to be funded by Brussels (Illustration 1 
perfectly matches this distorted reading). But is it the case that eastern Europe was so void of any 
internal resources for the project of European integration? Surely, the imposition of Sovietization 
and Stalinism had dire consequences in terms of cult of personality, control of the Communist Party 
and loss of economic, political or cultural autonomy. Yet, there were diverse attempts within 
eastern Europe to remodel socialism with a human face or to propose autonomy with different 
forms (certain writings of Castoriadis (1976) such as the The Hungarian Source are reminders of 
internal dynamics that have been overlooked and possibly forgotten in contemporary 
historiography), and Yougoslavia was a living example of what we could call a possibly creative 
de-alignment throughout the cold war, not to mention Charter 77 and many other non-orthodox 
communist underground movements in eastern Europe inspired by the Helsinki conference. Yet, by 
portraying eastern Europe as a single entity, one tends to loose these elements and consider only the 
common exposure to Soviet totalitarianism, which will not do justice to different national 
experiences and legacies. Paul Blokker’s latest work (see his paper for this Conference) is precisely 
about retrieving the positive impact of central and eastern European political thought on political 
theory in general deserves particular attention against a reducing view on eastern Europe, while 
Christian Domnitz has presented elsewhere a typology of rich discourses about Europe that 
emerged in the Ostblock in the period 1970-1990 (Domnitz 2008). This latter work demonstrates 
how certain themes of a cultural Europe premised on Christianity or other historical traits have also 
emerged in the shadow of communism and highlight some common ground between East and West 
of Europe, far from views depicting Eastern Europe as void of possible contribution to Europe at 
large.  
 
3. b) ‘European’ identity and history 
 The second problem with a certain idea of ‘Europe’ is related to the question of collective 
identity (and we will touch here on the necessity of auto-institution on the cognitive level 
introduced in the introduction). As known from social sciences, the question of identity is a very 
slippery one for it automatically refers to a political project and/or point of view (Wagner 2005). 
With regard to collective identity18 one should always consider the relation of a polity to its present, 
future but also to its past. An integrated Europe in the present form is an agglomerate of 27 member 
states whose future is to aim at integrating into a single market and, possibly, expand to include new 
member states in the future. Even if the stress is put on the acquis communautaire (expressed 
generally in legal terms) as a binding common element to the 27 member states, there remains the 
dividing element of different historical pasts. We could say here that western and eastern Europes 
(if we take these two realms as cohesive entities for the sake of the intellectual exercise) are in a 
                                                 
18 Another quaestio vexata is the difference between individual and collective identity. On this topic, see Winter & 
Sivan (1999: Intro), Bottici (2009). 
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situation of allochronism, in the sense that they are not in the same position and situation with 
regard to their past and do not have the same critical distance to their own history in order to 
perform the Vergangenheitsbewältigung that any polity has to perform after traumatic experiences.  
 
Judt perfectly demonstrates how the end of WW2, Soviet rule and the liberation from 
USSR’s yoke have provoked serious distortions of the past and have made of the past ‘another 
country’ (Judt 2002). Thus, the imposition of a Soviet totalitarian domination and the destruction of 
eastern European’s public spheres, the remoulding of national pasts according to class struggle 
lines, the many damnationes memoriae and violent purges imposed during forty years, not to 
mention the problematic return of newly rediscovered heroes resisting Sovietization in the last 15 
years (ibid.) and the surge of destructive nationalisms since the fall of the wall are all examples that 
the past still weigh heavily on eastern European shoulders. Yet, this weigh is difficult to tackle for 
not enough time has passed since. Western Europe, on the other hand, has had more time to 
confront its past and reconcile certain divide that traumatic experiences such as WW2 or the 
political instabilities of the immediate post-war in France, Italy or Germany provoked (yet, this does 
not mean that the Bewältigung has been perfect neither completed).  
 
 On the question of collective memory and Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the work of Stefan 
Troebst (2005. 2006) is most useful for he points to the fragmented themes of memory across 
Europe. If the Holocaust is a fundamental point for collective western European memory, other 
themes occupy the fore of collective debates in Central and Eastern European countries, changing 
from the trauma of foreign occupations and dismemberment by Nazi and then Soviet troops 
(Poland, Baltic Countries, e.g.), the Gulag experience, or also the terrible recollection of Holodomor 
(the 1932-33 famine in parts of the Soviet Union which struck large parts of Ukraine). Troebst is 
correct to state that the 2004 enlargement has revealed the depth of the difference in terms of 
collective memory between East and West Europe.19  
 
Henri Rousso’s article on the dilemma of a European identity (2004) is central for our 
discussion of heterochrony. Rousso indicates first that there seems to be a pattern in which 
collective occultation and recollection of historical traumas follow one another (amnesia, 
anamnesis, etc.). Second, there are also uncompressible times through which historical memory has 
to go through before any given large social group is able to accept a commonly shared interpretation 
of the collective past: one cannot expect that a society will deal with its past right after the end of a 
traumatic experience. Judt’s concluding essay ‘From the House of Dead’ of his Postwar (2005) 
shows the timing and length of occultation of certain debates. To come back to the theme that 
‘Europe’ is in need of a common memory to reinforce its sense of identity,  one should note that if 
‘Europe’ is about using western European historical experience as a possible foundation for a 
European identity (as a way to go beyond war between nations, and per antonomase a war between 
France and Germany), then this historical experience might not be easily accepted by Eastern 
Europeans for two reasons. First, because not all Eastern Europeans have the same traumatic past to 
confront (Troebst 2006) and because they are in a different phase of their work on memory 
(Erinnerungsarbeit) since they have just come out the traumatic Soviet domination for forty years.  
 
We are now back to the allochronism question. If one sustains that Eastern Europeans are 
dragging their feet in acknowledging the centrality of the Holocaust for a common European 
identity, this is not just putting them in another time (a la Fabian), but it is also forcing onto them a 
certain theme to confront at the expenses of those considered more urgent by the collective memory 
                                                 
19 „Auch der Holocaust-Holodomor-Gedächtnisgraben ist erst im Zuge der EU-Erweiterung sichtbar geworden. Um 
Überschwang der Nach-Wende-Zeit waren diese Themen nicht erörtert worden. Die öffentliche Diskussion hat gerade 
erst begonnen.” (Troebst 2005).  
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of this region. It is in this condition that an allochronic statement (‘they are dragging their feet..’) 
becomes an alienating statement leading to a situation of heterochrony, that is a situation of 
cognitive heteronomy motivated in terms of different time locations. 
 
 The literature on Central and Eastern Europe and from Eastern European writers abound of 
the theme of allochronism. The idea of a ‘return’ to Europe implies in an indirect way different time 
locations and the necessity of ‘touching base’ with the main time of Europe. Some of Czeslaw 
Milosz’s writings about his experience as a Pole in western Europe is tainted of connotation of 
backwardness and how this self-perception has affected him and co-nationals.20 Note that 
allochronism is by no means a feature of western Europeans, but also by eastern Europeans 
themselves21. Barbra Törnquist-Plewa notes that “Polish ‘Euro-enthusiasts’ who advocate a speedy 
integration into the EU are deeply critical of Polish society and accuse it of being conservative, 
limited, fanatically religious, nationalistic, burdened with the heritage of the past and immature.” 
(Törnquist-Plewa 2002: 237). The fact that allochronic trope can at times become heterochrony is 
exemplified in the following quote of  Janis Peters, Chairman of the Writers’ Union of the Latvian 
Republic and Latvian writer answering a comment in 1989 about Russians: “The proposition that 
the Russians are worse off is no consolation for the Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians, or a reason 
for waiting for a deteriorating situation also in the Baltic area. Why compare us with less developed 
regions? Compare us instead with Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark” (quoted in Karlsson 
2002: 182). Here clearly the writer expresses the view that the Baltic countries resent being ascribed 
to a backward situation and would prefer to choose to be compared and be part of the more 
advanced Scandinavian club. 
 
 Heterochrony is therefore a serious hurdle in the ideational convergence of self-perceptions 
as ‘Europeans’ by Eastern Europeans. This impression for Central and East Europe that a certain 
past and certain type of Erinnerungsarbeit that provide significance mostly to western Europeans 
are leading Eastern Europeans to a certain form of resentment towards ‘Europe’.22 Törnquist-Plewa 
stresses in the Polish case that “identification with Europe is made difficult by the fact that Poles do 
not feel accepted by those they want to identify with” (Törnquist-Plewa 2002: 239).  This problem 
can hardly be written off for large parts of Eastern Europe which has suffered from external power 
(Fremdherrschaft) and it is extremely important to acknowledge this problem. So, while Troebst is 
right in pointing to a variety of traumas that Europeans have to confront, one should also think of 
the timing of trauma elaboration and Erinnerungsarbeit. One cannot therefore expect, e.g., 
Estonians to recognize the centrality of Holocaust for a European memory, when it is still facing 
burning questions about the past of Soviet occupation and Russification policies (Kattago 2008a) 
and has become (again) independent ‘not even’ twenty years ago. Any society should therefore 
have the right, on a cognitive level, to say: “Holocaust, or Holodomor, is not the central worry for 
us now” and assert its own priority in terms of collective memory, if such statements are 
accompanied by a corollary moral obligation to acknowledge the suffering of others. If not, there is 
an imposition from outside23 of a given memory agenda that prevents full autonomy for that 
society. As put by the Estonian scholar Siobhan Kattago (2008b), there should be, between eastern 
and western Europe an ‘agreement to disagree’ on memory and cultural identity.  
 
                                                 
20 See some quotes in Törnquist-Plewa (2002: 232ff) 
21 This echoes the existence of oriental ‘Orientalists’ (a la Said) described in the contect of the Middle East by Sadiki 
(2004: 180ff). Note that these oriental orientalists or in our case Eastern European allochronists are an indirect witness 
of a profound asymmetrical relations between two polities. 
22 Similarly, in Turkey, many people are becoming increasingly Euro-skeptic in part for the reasons stated here. 
23 This is not to say that foreigners should have no say in the public debates about collective history and memory of 
another country. At times it can be salutary, if one think of the role of Paxton  for France to eventually confront its 
Vichy past.  
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3. c) Europe as a western European experience 
 The third and final problem with a certain projection about the integration of Europe on lies 
in forcing the possibility of a common fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft) for the whole of Europe. If this 
is done too rigidly, and by not taking into consideration the fact that by ‘European’ experience we 
speak in reality of western Europe’s historical experience, then it will be difficult for Eastern 
Europeans to accept a new imposition of a hegemonic past (Judt 2002). Indeed, there are some 
biases on the history of European integration that are the result of the context of the nascent Cold 
War which witnessed the birth of the first European institutions that still loom over certain debates 
and themes. Looking at the history of European integration through the prism of the Cold War, as 
done by Messenger (2006) is a good reminder (against the euphoria of federalist historiography24) 
of the serious security considerations at stake in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the time where the 
first European communities were founded. What such history does not tell us really is that the 
context of Cold War served also an ‘imaginary war’, to take the phrase of Kaldor (1990) where the 
enemy was not so much the external ‘other’ (eastern European communism, or Stalinism as it was 
frequently described) but the internal ‘other’, namely the opposition of the western European 
communists in western Europe (or the red threat in the USA of the McCarthy era). The consequence 
of this was that for a few decades the discourse of the threat of the Soviets and of Stalinism (which 
was tied to the first years of the European communities) served the purpose of taming part of the 
political forces in the Europe of the Six (communist parties and trade unions in particular), 
undermining thus the possibility of representing the construction of a new Europe as a political 
project of all its citizens, and even in some cases alienating some segments of the population from 
supporting the European cause.25 So one consequence of the brandishing of external other’s threat 
for ‘Europe’ with a view on internal affairs was that it turned effectively this external other into a 
forgotten other of Europe, in the sense that it reinforced the view that Eastern Europe was totally 
equated with threat and no other potential constitutive elements.   
  
In a parallel way, and to come back to current times, one could say that a political Europe 
ought to be careful when representing itself as a positive project offering equal opportunity for all in 
its drive to open up new horizons for eastern Europeans and integrate into (western) Europe. After 
all, there is a sense of a Europe with two speeds, on the one hand, one within the Euro-zone and (at 
least until to the first days of 2008) with a differentiated access to mobility (with the Schengen area) 
and a reality of a prosperous western Europe and, on the other hand, still devastated socio-economic 
landscapes of the former eastern block. The contrast between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Länder in 
Germany is a cruel reminder of this two-speed Europe. So to take up again the image of the Cold 
War, it is one thing to remind us of the historical origins of ‘Europe’, but another are the long-
lasting consequences of the Cold War: to a certain degree, European integration of eastern Europe 
has overlapped with the military expansion of NATO, the history of ‘Europe’ is mostly that of a 
western Christian (be it Catholic or Protestant) Europe (at the expenses of an Orthodox and also 
from a Muslim Europe). Current debates about civil society, economic development, or standards of 
living still echo some of the debates of the 1950s about democracy and development (thinking back 
on Lipset’s Political Man (1960), or his ‘Requisites to Democracy’ (1959), or Rostow’s Non-
communist Manifesto (1960), etc.). The Cold War might be over in facts, but ‘Europe’ might still 
carry along some of its scoria (Laqueur’s Last days of Europe: Epitaph for an old continent ought 
to be read critically in this light, I think). It would instead be interesting to explore, in the line of 
Domnitz (2008), another type of historiography that looks at the point of view of the ‘other’, in this 
case Eastern European themselves, that considers dissident intra-east European points of view both 
of the past and current times, or that sheds new lights on the continuing tensions within Eastern 
                                                 
24 See Dinand (2006) and also Kaiser (2006). 
25 It is interesting to see how communist parties of western Europe have changed their position on Europe from the 
1960s onwards, gradually becoming less anti-Europeanist to declared pro-Europeanists for most of them nowadays.  
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European societies after the 2004 enlargement. The best example consists of the puzzle of violent 
riots in Hungary to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 1956 stand off, a proof of a continuing 
malaise despite a ‘successful’ transition, while the conflict over the Soviet War Memorial in Tallinn 
illustrates the need for non-hegemonic interpretations of the past in post-national polities (Kattago 
2008a). 
 
4. A final word: The Other of Europe and Heterochrony 
 
This paper is a call to consider eastern Europe not simply as the void ‘other’ of (western) 
Europe by 1989 and to a-void western-euro-centrism at large when looking at European integration 
and 1989. Indeed when the presence of external ‘others’ loom over certain political debates or serve 
as a marker of differentiation between large social groups, this is often done at the expenses of a 
sound discussion of each other’s points of view and all too often serve only emotional purposes 
(one of which can be a repli identitaire fed by collective resentment) and lead to essentalisations 
both of the internal content of what ‘Europe’ is about (in terms of borders, culture, identity, or 
memory), and about its ‘others’—past and present ones.26  
 
Since Eastern Europe is the geographical space from which the ‘other’ of Stalinism and 
communism threatened the Europe of the Six in the 1950s, one should examine the relations 
between a political Europe and Eastern Europe also in this light and with great attention. Surely 
Eastern Europe no longer represents such an ‘other’ for a political Europe, but lasting imprints of 
the cold war period and mental maps (as shown in Ill. 2 and its contemporary version in Ill. 1) 
might render this work difficult. Now that ‘Europe’ is made of 27 member states, surely the centre 
of gravity of a common political Europe has moved eastwards, a fact that one could clearly perceive 
in the latest round of harsh negotiations (especially from Poland who tries to maximize its full 
membership into the EU and does not hesitate to behave, at times, in an arrogant manner since it is 
now part of the club) around the Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007. Yet, when it comes to 
writing the history of Europe or the description of ‘Europe’ as a cultural entity, the centre of gravity 
probably still has to be re-adjusted accordingly, giving more voice and space to eastern European 
experiences and projects. If not, one risks creating artificial binaries rendering ideational 
convergence around the EU impossible. 
 
 Such binary divides can also be found in the self-reflective dimensions of Europe when a 
certain type of occidentalist literature contributes to otherize through a variety of means and tropes 
about Central and Eastern European societies. One dimension of this contemporary ‘otherization’ 
process that we have discussed in this paper and which is, in our view, understudied, is the question 
of allochronism and this tendency to ascribe groups to different time locations. We have argued that 
the capacity of auto-institution on the cognitive level is as important for the viability of the 
European project as structural convergence around the EU has been and is for the 12 new member 
states. This capacity of auto-institution for Eastern European societies is currently most vividly 
necessary on the field of Erinnerungsarbeit, Vergangenheitsbewältigung and collective memory 
around the question of a ‘cultural Europe’. If not Eastern European societies feel that they are 
                                                 
26 For some preliminary conclusion on the study of Islam and Turkey as the ‘other’ of Europe, see Challand (2008). For 
a plea to be more inclusive about the nature and content of ‘Europe’ see Shore ( 2000: 63):  
“[…] Creating the ‘European identity’, as depicted in EU discourse, entails a degree of exclusion of the Other. […] 
‘European identity tends to become meaningful only when contrasted to that which is not Europe. As Europe 
consolidates and converges, and as the barriers between European nation-states are eliminated, so the boundaries 
separating Europe from its Third World ‘Others’ have intensified. […] The problem with this approach to identity is its 
absolutism: its failure to recognise cultures as composite and hybrid entities.” 
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placed in a situation of heterochrony, this condition might lead to more than ‘mere’ ideational 
divergence, but possibly outright political standoff between different parties. Without referring to 
the question of heterochrony, the situation that Troebst describes about the impasse around the 
creation of a European Network of Memory and Solidarity (Troebst 2007) between Germany and 
Poland is, in part, close to one of heterochrony and where the current situation is an effective end to 
transnational collaboration. Difficult in these circumstances to envisage further ‘integration’ and 
larger debates about Europe as a cultural project. Going back to a better understanding of 1989 
might instead lay the path of a richer and more diverse understanding of what constitutes Europe, 
East and West. 
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